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LOLA A. LIND
V.
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
STATE OF ALASKA
SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA
March I4, 1980
Appellant Lola Lind obtained superior court review of a decision of
the Commissioner of Labor which denied unemployment benefits to her based on
her lack of "availability for suitable work." The superior court affirmed
the administrative denial and this appeal followed.
Lola Lind worked as a school teacher in Port Heiden, Alaska, during
the 1971-72 school year, and in Chignik Lake In 1972-1973. Both communi-
ties are small villages on the Alaska Peninsula. In 1973, Lind moved to
Anchorage and obtained employment with the National Bank of Alaska. After
one and one-half years, she left the bank to work for Carr's Quality Centers
as a bookkeeper. She left Carr's on April 14, 1976, to move back to Chignik
Lake with her husband who had been laid off his job on the Alaska pipeline
and who owned a home in Chignik Lake.
Shortly before she terminated her employment with Carr's, Lind filed
an application for unemployment compensation with the Employment Security
DivIsion of the Department of Labor. Lind received a notice on May 7, 1976
from the Department that there was question regarding her eligibility for
benefits because she had quit her last job. Additional Information was
requested, and was promptly supplied. On May'26, 1976, a "Notice of Deter-
mination" was sent to Lind stating that she was to be allowed unemployment
insurance benefits beginning May 9, 1976 (if otherwise eligible) and that
the disqualifying provisions of AS 23.20.380(2)1 did not apply because
"-.- 7ou left your job... to join your husband at Chignik Lake. This is con-
sidered good cause for leaving a job and benefits are allowed as shown above."
Another notice was then mailed to Lind, which informed her that there
was a question regarding her eligibility for benefits because she had "moved
to an area where little work exists for you." An enclosed questionnaire was
completed by Lind and returned on June I, 1976. Finally, on June I1, 1976,
T AS 23.20.380 provides in part:
Disqualification for benefits. An insured worker is disqualified for
waiting-week credit or benefits for a week of his unemployment if with
respect to the week the department finds that
(I) he was not able to work or was not available for suitable
work for the week;
(2) he left suitable work voluntarily without good cause; in this
case he is disqualified for the week in which he left work and
the five weeks of continuous unemployment immediately following
that week; the period of disqualification is not terminated by
performance of short time casual or temporary work within the
period.
a second "Notice of Determination" was sent which stated that she had removea
herself from the labor market and, in consequence, was no longer fully avail-
able for work.2 Benefits were denied beginning May 14, 1976. Lind appealed
from this unfavorable determination by letter.
After further intermediate administrative procedures were completed,
the Commissioner of Labor adopted the findings of fact that a referee had
entered3 and sustained the denial of benefits to Lind. Based on a review of
the matter on the administrative record, the superior court judge affirmed
the decision of the Commissioner denying unemployment benefits to Lind.
Eligibility for unemployment benefits is conditioned upon the appli-
cant being genuinely attached to the labor force. Arndt v. State Department
of Labor, 583 P.2d 799, 801; L. Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work.
55 Yale L. J. 123, 124 (1945). In order to be genuinely attached to the
labor force one must be, among other things, available for suitable work, a
standard which Is met when the Individual is willing to work and is available
to a substantial field of employment. Arndt, 583 P.2d at 802. In this case
Lind is willing to accept all suitable employment; the question is whether
there exists for her in the area of Chignik Lake a substantial field of em-
ployment.
The Commissioner found that there was no substantial field of employ-
ment for Mrs. Lind in the local labor market of Chignik Lake. Hit decision
is supported by substantial evidence and is, therefore, affirmed.
2 The "Notice of Determination" further explained:
Available evidence indicates that you left an area with substantial pos-
sibilities for work (Anchorage) to move with your husband to Chignik
Lake. You show no possibility of finding work at Chignik Lake except
occasional substitute teaching during the school year.
3 In the Findings of Fact, the referee stated:
I find that Mrs. Lind Is experienced as a teacher, in the field of ac-
counting and also as a bank teller. Her work history indicates that she
has worked In the Anchorage area from August 1973 until April of 1976.
At that time, Mrs. Lind moved with her husband to the community of
Chignik Lake, which has a population of approximately 100 people.
Though she Is an experienced teacher, Mrs. Lind has testified that she
cannot gain employment as a teacher In the Chignik Lakes area because
the teachers there are hired as a married couple and her husband is not
a teacher. She does expect to gain some employment as a substitute
teacher, however this would only involve possibly 16 hours per month.
Mrs. Lind I find, has for all practical purposes, no other prospect of
gaining any employment in the Chignik Lake area, and she is not willing
to leave that area as her husband is now employed there as a commercial
fisherman.
The record shows that there are five suitable positions at most in
Chignik Lake.
One important factor in the Commissioner's decision is the fact that
Lind moved from an area in which her services were in demand to a place "where
work is nearly non-existent in her profession." The fact of such a move is
relevant, in our opinion, to a determination of whether an applicant is gen-
uinely attached to the labor market. Several decisions of other courts so
indicate. Employment Security Commission v. Kosic, 476 P.2d 834, 835 (Ariz.
1970) ("there is virtual unanimity that the worker is unavailable who leaves
a locality of industrial activity and moves to an area where little or no
opportunity exists for work within his qualifications," quoting Altmas,
Availability for Work (1950), at 206-07); Wadiington v. Mindes, 259 N.E.2d
257, 26 (11i. 1970); Vasquez v. Board of Review, 317 A,2d 7W4, 746 (N.J.
Super. 1974); Leach v. Board of Review, 178 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ohio App. 1961);
Claim of Sapp,W P.2d 1027, 1030 (Idaho 1954).
Lind also contends that the final determination which denied her bene-
fits was an improper reversal of the initial determination which had granted
them. Also Lind argues that she was denied a fair opportunity to be heard
because the hearing was held in Anchorage and not in Chignik Lake as she had
requested. We have reviewed these points and find no error.
AFFIRMED.
RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The determinative issue raised in this appeal is whether, after
moving from the largest city in the State of Alaska to a village with an
approximate population of 100 persons, Lind remains available for suitable
work within the meaning of the controlling statute. Alaska has a compre-
hensive program which promotes employment security through the maintenance
of a public employment office and the payment of compensation to unemployed
individuals, AS 23.20.005-535. Eligibility for unemployment benefits
is conditioned upon an individual being genuinely attached to the labor
force. An individual can satisfy this condition by remaining "available for
suitable work."l
In Arndt v. State, Department of Labor, 583 P.2d 799, 802 (Alaska,
1978), this court adopted a two-pronged test for determining whether a claim-
ant is "available for work" within the meaning of the statute.
The test requires'(l) that an indi-
vidual claimant be willing to accept suit-
able work which he has no good cause for
refusing and (2) that the claimant thereby
make himself available to a substantial
field of employment.'... 2 /
AS 23.20.385 defines suitable work as follows:
Suitable work. (a) No work may be considered suitable and benefits shall
not be denied under a provision of this chapter to an otherwise eligible
individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following con-
ditions:
(I) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lock-
out, or other labor dispute;
(2) if the wages, hours, and other conditions of the work offered are
substantially less favorable to the individual than those pre-
vailing for similar work in the locality;
(3) if, as a condition of being employed, the individual would be
required to Join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from Joining a bona fide labor organization.
(b) In determining whether work is suitable for a claimant
and in determining the existence of good cause for leaving or refusing work,
the department shall, in addition to determining the existence of any of
the conditions specified in (a) of this section, consider the degree of risk
to the claimant's health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness for the
work, his prior training and experience, his prior earnings, the length of
his unemploymert, his prospects for obtaining work at his highest skill,
the distance of the available work from his residence, his prospects for
obtaining local work, and other factors which influence a reasonably pru-
dent person in the claimant's circumstances.
(c) This section shall be given the same meaning as the Sec
retary o f Labor gives to Sec. 3304(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.
See Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978); State, Dep't
of Labor v. Boucher, 591 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).
2 Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799, 802 (Alaska 1978), otj
Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.Zd 740, 748 (Cal. 1977)
(footnote omitted).
The first prong of the Arndt test is satisfied since It is apparent
that Lind is willing to accept all suitable work; her only limitation is that
the employment must be located in the Chignik Lake area.3 The remaining
determinative question is whether, by limiting herself to suitable work in
Chignik Lake, Lind remains available to a substantial field of employment.4
Since this inquiry requires information concerning job market con-
ditions which are within the specialized knowledge and particular field of
expertise of the Department of Labor, I would employ the "reasonable basis"
standard of reviewing in determining the correctness of the Department of
Labor's ruling as to whether or not a person is available to a "substantial
field of employment." 5
In Arndt. the case was remanded to the Department of Labor because the
record as a whole did not contain substantial evidence regarding the job mar-
ket in Kodiak to convince this court that the Department's decision rested
on a "reasonable basis." 6 Further, Arndt placed the burden on the Depart-
ment of Labor to prove that a claimant's availability does not extend to a
sufficiently substantial field of employment once the claimant has shown that
3 Alaska's Employment Security Act does not contemplate that Lola Lind be
willing to leave her permanent home with her husband in ChIgnik Lake and
travel to another part of the state to accept employment in order to
become eligible for unemployment compensation. AS 23.20.385(3)(b) specifi-
cally allows for consideration of the distance of available work from one's
residence in determining whether the work is suitable and whether the
claimant has good cause for refusing the employment opportunity. AS 23.20.385
is set out in full in note I supra.
4 As stated in Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799, 802 (Alaska 1978):
"Because availability also entails accessibility to work for which there
is some demand, further Inquiry is necessary to insure that the claimant
remains available for work for which there is a substantial field of potential
employers." See also Glick v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Od., 591 P.2d 24,
28 (Cal. 1979.
5 Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799, 803 n.* (Alaska 1978).
6 Id. at 803.
she Is available for, suitable work which she has no good cause for refusing.
7
In determining the extent of a claimant's employment market, Arndt enjoins
the Department to consider all employment possibilities for which the claim-
ant is "capable and available."8
In my view, the instant case presents a situation similar to that
which this court was faced with in the Arndt case. Lind moved to Chignik
Lake because of her domestic situation. By doing so, she limited her possi-
bilities for employment. Nevertheless, under Arndt, the Department of Labor
had the burden of proving that Lind's availability for work does not extend
to a substantial field of employment.
The evidence In the record regarding the field of employment for which
Lind was available in the Chignik Lake area is limited to a listing by Lind
of possible employers, or fields of employment, in her answers to interrog-
atories. These include teacher and other positions in the local school
district, the cannery, a general store, the state's bilingual education pro-
gram, and a possibility of going fishing in August with her husband.
9 All
of the first four possibilities were filled at the time tind answered the
relevant interrogatories.
Based on this evidence, the Department o Labor arrived at the follow-
ing findings of fact:
I find that Mrs. Lind is experienced as
a teacher, in the field of accounting and
also as a bank teller. Her work history
7 In connection with this point we explained:
The second part of the test requires information about job market
conditions which would be within the specialized knowledge and particular
expertise of the Labor Department. Since the Department's expertise is
involved in deciding whether a person is still available to a 'substantial
field of employment,' we use the 'reasonable basis' standard of review.
However, in the instant case we find that the record as a whole does not
contain substantial evidence about the job market In 'Kodiak to convince us
that the Department's conclusion rests on a 'reasonable basis.' Therefore,
we cannot agree that Arndt's self imposed limitation made her unavailable
to such a substantial degree that she cannot be considered fully available
for suitable work. The Department of Labor has particular knowledge and
expertise with regard to local economic conditions and employment markets.
Accordingly, where a claimant has shown she is available for suitable work
which she has no good cause for refusing, the Department shall have the
burden of proving, if it so believes, that this availability does not extend
to a sufficiently 'substantial field of employment.' / footnotes omitted-7
8 Id. at 803 n.l0.
9 The record further shows that Lind was willing to go to work as soon as any
jobs became available. Additionally, the record discloses that Lind was
expecting to work approximately two days per month substitute teaching at
Chignik Lake. As indicated earlier in this dissent, it was also shown that
she had taught at Chignik Lake and at Port Heiden in prior years.
indicates that she has worked in the
Anchorage area from August 1973 until
April of 1976. At that time, Mrs. Lind
moved with her husband to the community
of Chignik Lake, which has a population
of approximately 100 people.
Though she is an experienced teacher,
Mrs. Lind has testified that she cannot
gain employment as a teacher in the
Chignik Lakes area because the teachers
there are hired as a married couple and
her husband is not a teacher. She does
expect to gain some employment as a sub-
stitute teacher, however this would only
involve possibly 16 hours per month.
Mrs. Lind I find, has for all practical
purposes, no other prospect of gaining
any employment in the Chignik Lake area,
and she is not willing to leave that area
as her husband is now employed there as a
commercial fisherman.
The Department therefore concluded that:
In the instant matter I hold that Mrs. Lind
is not available for work. Her choice of
residence has removed her from the Anchorage
labor market where she has worked in recent
years to a place where work is nearly non-
existent in her profession.
In my view, the Department of Labor has failed to meet its burden
of showing that its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light
of the record as a whole. Lind's answers to the interrogatories state that
jobs existed at Chignik Lake, that she had previously worked there, and
that she would not refuse any job offered there. No contrary evidence
appears in the record. In reaching its decision, the Department of Labor
appears to have relied solely on the referee's determination that, as com-
pared to the employment situation in Anchorage, the labor market in Chignik
Lake is "nearly non-existent in /-Lind's
7 profession." I reject this
rationale on two separate ground;. First, the labor market in Anchorage
and Lind's availability for work there are irrelevant to her present claim
for unemployment compensation.
There is no requirement that a claim-
ant must be available for work in a locality
in which / she-/ last worked or resided.
The fast that a claimant has moved from
one place to another does not form a basis
for holding / her_/ unavailable for work
even if it appears that /-her/ chances
for employment would have-been better if
/ she / had remained in / her-/ former
locality. 10 /
If the labor market in Anchorage was the standard against which to
Judge the substantiality of the field of employment available to Lola Lind
in Chignik Lake, an unfair penalty on eligibility for unemployment compen-
sation thereby would be effectively imposed upon those persons moving from
urban centers to the more rural areas of Alaska. I think that a claimant's
genuine attachment to the labor market must be tested by the local and area
economic conditions. As one commentator has concluded:
A labor market for an individual
exists when there is a market for
the type of services which he offers
in the geographical area in which he
offers them. "Market" in this sense does
not mean that job vacancies must exist;
the purpose of unemployment compensation
is to compensate for the lack of appropri-
ate job vacancies. It means only that the
type of services which an individual is
offering is generally performed in the
geographical area in which he is offer-
ing them. I1 /
The Department of Labor made no showing that, within the pertinent labor
market, Lind was not available to a sufficient number of employment
opportunities to meet the availability requirement.
12
Second, the Department's conclusions improperly limited evaluation
of Lind's fiel.d of employment to teaching, accounting and bank teller work.
However, Lind indicated in her answers to interrogatories that she was avail-
able to all of the job openings for which she was qualified in the Chignik
Lake area. While it is accepted that a claimant may limit her availability
T 'Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Kosic, 471 P.2d 757, 760 (Ariz. App. 1970)
c-iation omitted), vacated,--'76 P.2d 834 (Ariz. 1970). See generally
Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d T.-MO-83 (1950).
11 Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 Yale L.J. 123, 124 (1945).
See also Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Kosic, 471 P.2d 757, 760-61 (Ariz. App.
1970), vacated, 476 P.2d 8347Ariz. I970); Parsons v. Employment Sec. Commn,
379 P.2d 57, 60 (N.M. 1963).
12 "/-E/ven if an employment field is not large in absolute terms, it may
neve'rtheless satisfy the availability requirement if it presents a sub-
stantial employment opportunity for a claimant." Sanchez v. Unemployment
Ins. ApptLs ed., 569 P.2d 740, 748 n.1l (Cal. 1977. See also Glick v.
Uremployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 591 P.2d 24, 28 (Cal. 1979.
to jobs similar to the trades previously engaged in,13 nothing prevents a
claimant from expanding the field of employment she is available to by seek-
ing other types of work. "The purpose of the availability requirement is
to insure a willingness to accept suitable work, not to tie a claimant to a
previous occupation."114
Without relying on assumptions concerning availability based on Lind's
removal from the Anchorage labor market and her prior occupations, no sub-
ordinate facts in the record support the Commissioner of Labor's conclusion
that Lola Lind had removed herself from availability to a substantial field
of employment. I would therefore conclude that the Labor Department's deter-
mination which was affirmed by the superior court is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Thus, I would reverse the superior court's decision with
directions to remand the matter to the Department of Labor for an award of
an appropriate amount of unemployment benefits to Lola Lind.
13 AS 23.20.385(b) establishes several criteria for determining what con-
stitutes suitable work for an eligible individual, including "the degree
of risk to the claimant's health, safety, and morals, his physical fatness
for the work, his prior training and experience, his prior earnings, the
length of unemployment, his prospects for obtaining work at his highest
skill...and other factors which influence a reasonably prudent person in
the claimant's circumstances."
A Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 751 r.17 (Cal.
1977). See also Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 p.2d 799, 803 n.l0
(Alaska ); Davyv. Comnwealth, Unempioyment Compensation Bd.,
392 A.2d 330, 332 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
COMMENT: Chief Justice Rabinowitz' dissent raises one most Interesting point.
Therein he states (supra, p. ): "First, the labor market in Anchorage and
Lind's availability for work there are irrelevant to her present claim for
...compensation.
If the labor market in Anchorage was the standard against which to judge the
substantiality of the field of employment available to Lola Lind in Chignik
Lake, an unfair penalty on eligibility for unemployment compensation thereby
would be effectively imposed upon those persons moving from urban centers to
the more rural areas of Alaska."
Query: If one is penalized for movement from a "real" labor market to a most
rural area, and if the move crosses state lines, does not such a penalty
violate the "freedom to travel" clause of the U.S. Constitution? Alaska has
had several laws blatantly favoring residents struck down by Alaska and Federal
courts on that basis.
Prof. Paul R. Troeh , Jr.
The question raised by Prof. Troeh was addressed by a three-judge District
Court in Galvan v. Catherwood, 324 F. Supp. 1016 (D.C., N.Y. 1971), aff'd
490 F.2d 1255, cert. der. 417 U.S. 936. New York State had adopted a policy
of denying unemployment compensation to persons who relocated to an area of
"high persistent unemployment," thereby allegedly limiting their prospects
for re-employment. Observing that the right to travel is not absolute, the
Court expressed the dictum (324 F. Supp. 1019) that the restriction of the
right was minor, and was reasonably and directly related to a valid state
interest - namely, that a claimant be "ready, willing and able ;o work"
(i.e., that he be "available" for employment). However, the cas, was re-
manded for a hearing to determine whether New York applied the p.sl icy only
to persons who relocated from New York to Puerto Rico, in possible violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. New York has since abandoned the restriction.
